



## U.S. Foreign Military Sales: Opportunities for Responding to Ever-Growing Demand

### Call for Proposals

The Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU) proposes to publish an edited volume on foreign military sales (FMS). The purpose of the volume is to help policymakers, planners, and implementers to think differently about FMS challenges and opportunities. The key audience is the security cooperation professional and aims to inform the practice of security cooperation. The volume will be organized around four FMS-relevant themes, each with three to five chapters of scholarly quality: law and policy, industry, process, and partnerships.

Given the ambitious timeline of this project, DSCU will accept proposals based on existing or ongoing work, or even repurposing already published work for which contributors secure the appropriate permissions. There is also a possibility of funding for contributors to complete or update research. DSCU is positioned to provide access to relevant officials involved directly in the FMS program and/or security cooperation case management, in the interest of advancing research and knowledge on this important subject. DSCU sees this as a unique opportunity to contribute to security cooperation.

### Scope

The proposed volume will focus on FMS (and foreign military financing, or FMF) as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. This includes all activities based on Title 22 FMS or FMF authorities. In common parlance, the term FMS refers to the transfer of defense articles and services for which the receiving country pays, but the same authority in the Arms Export Control Act that authorizes these sales also authorizes the U.S. Government to pay for these transfers.

The term FMS is thus a somewhat inaccurate catchall phrase that captures activities based on FMS program authority enshrined in law. This volume will also use the more general term “security cooperation case” to refer to specific transactions under FMS or other security cooperation and assistance authority, rather than “FMS case,” since in many instances transactions are conducted under different authorities. The FMS scoping of this volume would exclude analysis of direct commercial sales, the transfer of excess defense articles, third-party transfers, and the use of presidential drawdown authority. It would also exclude the use of Title 10 authorities, focusing instead on government-to-government transfers where the U.S. Government procures defense articles and services.

### Theme 1: Law and Policy

The [Conventional Arms Transfer Policy](#) (CATP), signed in February 2023, highlights potential policy and strategic opportunities inherent in the use of FMS authorities and strengthens a restriction on arms transfers that would “more likely than not” be used to commit atrocities:

The transfer of defense articles and services is an important tool for achieving United States foreign policy and national security objectives by helping allies and partners increase their contributions to global security, as well as by promoting shared interests with allies and partners. Acquisitions of United States defense articles and services by trusted allies and partners reinforce diplomatic relations

and deepen military interoperability, in turn shaping the international security environment in a manner that furthers United States foreign policy and national security interests (White House 2023).

In addition, the Department of State (DoS) [recognizes](#) that an age of strategic competition requires the United States to see FMS as “one of many ways the United States promotes interoperability and strengthens our unmatched network of alliances and security partnerships worldwide” (DoS 2023). Additionally, the newly released Department of Defense Instruction (DoD-I) on Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR) establishes Department-wide policy that assigns responsibility for the CHMR Action Plan that plays a role in arms transfer determinations (DoD 2023b). Likewise, the Department of Defense (DoD) *Learning and Evaluation Agenda for Partnerships* [recognizes](#) the importance of evidence in updating National Defense Strategy implementation guidance, updating directives and instructions, and allocating resources for security cooperation activities” (DoD 2022, 2). To address the myriad policy-themed challenges and opportunities associated with using FMS authority in the security cooperation case system, proposed chapters might examine one or more of the following questions:

- What is the role of the security cooperation case system in institutionalizing partner force capabilities and operationalizing integrated deterrence?
- What effect would different frameworks for integrating Title 10- and Title 22-funded activities have on achieving security cooperation outcomes?
- How would a regional approach to security cooperation case development look? How might alternative approaches look?
- What value proposition(s) would convince partners to choose U.S. systems and services, and under what conditions would the value proposition(s) be most effective?
- What legacy and recent factors shape the security cooperation case system? What do these dynamics mean for multipolar competition?
- What are the strategic tradeoffs between mitigating harm to civilians and expanding arms transfers in the context of strategic competition?
- What is the relationship between the security cooperation case process and recipient states’ commitment to improving transparency in the security sector?

### **Theme 2: Industry**

The crises in Israel and Ukraine have demonstrated a need to develop U.S. and global defense industrial base (DIB) capacity, with implications for the use of FMS authority in security cooperation cases. Increasing capacity might include “developing a comprehensive study to incentivize DIB investment in production capacity and building surge capability for high-demand, low-supply platforms, systems, and services” (DoD 2023). It could also include “use of multi-year contracts; enhanced use of the Special Defense Acquisition Fund; five-year predictive analyses of partner demand; and sustained engagement with the DIB” (DoD 2023). Proposed chapters might answer one or more of the following questions:

- What factors shape the defense industrial bases of the United States and its allies and partners, particularly in light of the Israel and Ukraine crises?
- What are the opportunities and challenges of exploring lower-cost value arms, coproduction with allies, and licensing for expanding DIB capacity? What does the history of the FMS system indicate about which approaches would work better than others?

- How would a better understanding of ally and partner defense needs inform management of industrial capacity?
- What are the opportunities and challenges to “strengthen the United States manufacturing and defense industrial base and ensure resiliency in global supply chains” (White House 2023)?
- To what extent does the FMS case system incentivize industry and firm behavior that supports security cooperation objectives?
- What are the risks and opportunities associated with offsets? To what extent would greater U.S. Government involvement in offsets influence industry and partner behavior? In what ways might this behavior change?

### **Theme 3: Process**

The security cooperation case process has generated challenges for allies, partners, and U.S. Government officials and practitioners alike. DoD established the Continuous Process Improvement Board to “implement recommendations and ensure elevation of emergent FMS issues to senior leadership.” The Board, comprised of senior leaders across the Security Cooperation enterprise, provides accountability in implementing recommendations, measuring impact, and continually pursuing areas to improve the overall security cooperation case process. Issues with this process include “enabling efficient reviews for release of technology,” “accelerating acquisition and contract support,” and “ensuring broad U.S. Government support” for improvements to the process (DoD 2023a). From the partner’s initial letter of request to the closure of a security cooperation case, a bevy of challenges and opportunities confront U.S. Government officials and practitioners. Many of these process issues have implications for the affordability of weapon systems and future DIB capacity. Proposed chapters might address one or more of the following process-related questions:

- What are the current consequences of deliberate decision-making in the security cooperation case system and what are the opportunities to appropriately calibrate intended and unintended consequences?
- DoD has begun to “review and update relevant policies and empower accountable officials to improve the efficiency of the... release of technology to allies and partner nations” (DoD 2023a). What shape and scope should this review take? What historical examples of organizational or process change might inform this review?
- To streamline U.S. Government acquisition and contracting in the security cooperation case system, DoD has committed to establishing “contract award standards and metrics as well as [developing] associated process maps to monitor the FMS prioritization and award process” (DoD 2023a). What can DoD learn from previous U.S. Government acquisition and contracting reform efforts that would inform changes to FMS-related acquisition and contracting today? How can DoD share these lessons with allies and partners to help counter corruption in their respective defense acquisition systems?
- DoD has proposed developing a “methodology to facilitate Non-Programs of Record,” which will in turn “better enable allies and partner nations to support their own national security needs” (DoD 2023a). How should decision-makers establish this new methodology? What historical frameworks and approaches might inform the shape and scope of this new methodology?
- What are the risks and opportunities inherent in efforts to streamline the Tiered Review and Congressional Notification processes?

- From the perspective of implementing agencies and case managers, what approaches work best to plan, execute, and resource multi-year security cooperation cases?
- What factors contribute to effective management of evidence to inform decision-making in the provision and prioritization of security cooperation cases? How might case managers and other implementing agency officials balance existing bureaucratic realities with emerging strategic priorities?
- What factors make reforming the security cooperation case system difficult?

### Theme 4: Partnership

Better understanding partner strategic, operational, and institutional contexts is a major pressure point and challenge for U.S. officials within the FMS case system. Continuous Process Improvement Board [recommendations](#) from 2022 seek to “improve the FMS system... to break down barriers to working with allies and partners.” In addition, DoD has committed to providing allies and partners “relevant priority capabilities” and improving DoD’s “understanding of ally and partner requirements” (DoD 2023a). The *DSCU Research Agenda* [highlights](#) the importance of understanding partner dynamics in achieving security cooperation objectives (DSCU 2023). Resolving these pressure points might involve shifts in planning and decision-making methodology, as well as continued professionalization of the U.S. security cooperation workforce. Proposed chapters might focus on one or more of the following questions:

- What role can workforce professionalization play in increasing understanding of FMS partners in DoD? What future opportunities does workforce certification and professionalization hold?
- The newly established Defense Security Cooperation Service (DSCS) is intended to streamline partner engagement on par with the Defense Attaché Service, established in the 1950s. What does the history of the Defense Attaché Service indicate about how using FMS cases to forge partnerships might change with the DSCS?
- What pathways to affordability and creative financing exist to improve the FMS value proposition for partners?
- What frameworks or approaches might be useful for DoS to implement a regional approach to FMS cases, where decision-makers can “save time on the policy approval process and further improve interoperability between U.S. and foreign partners by anticipating comparable demands for its neighbors and making anticipatory policy decisions for these countries’ potential future FMS purchases as well” (DoS 2023)?
- What interagency processes should be in place to prioritize investment in partner capabilities? What role should civilian harm baseline assessments of allies and partners play in identifying arms transfers that may warrant ancillary capabilities to mitigate civilian harm? What incentives need to be in place to end programs for uncooperative partners or to tell potential partners “no” when the likelihood of violations of international humanitarian law is high?
- To what extent do partner nation political will, absorptive capacity, and institutional capacity influence FMS strategy, planning, and resource decisions?
- How might the U.S. Government balance decision-making transparency and the prioritization of weapon systems for some partners over others?

## Timeline and Submissions

Nathan Toronto at DSCU and Hadd Jones at the FMS Center of Excellence are the lead editors for this project. The intended timeline is as follows:

- 15 January 2024: call for proposals opens, authors submit via an online form: <https://forms.osi.apps.mil/r/pT234DbRaj> (submissions must be unclassified and not contain any controlled unclassified information (CUI) or sensitive information)
- 15 March 2024: call for proposals closes
- 1 April 2024: selected authors notified
- May 2024: authors present in-progress reviews on research (there is a possibility that some of these reviews may occur at the FMS Symposium)
- 1 October 2024: authors submit final chapters (submissions must be unclassified and not contain any controlled unclassified information (CUI) or sensitive information)
  - 4,000–8,000 words (including notes), double-spaced, 12-point font, Microsoft Word
  - Citations: shortened notes and bibliography style, *Chicago Manual of Style*
- 15 November 2024: editors provide feedback
- 1 February 2025: authors submit revised chapters
- 1 March: DSCU Press submits final manuscript to DOPSR for security and policy review
- 1 April 2025: line editing, proofing, cover design, interior galleys produced
- 15 April 2025: authors review galley proofs
- 15 May 2025: book launch

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